
























zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study 
of Labor 
Contracts between Legal Persons
IZA DP No. 5352
December 2010
Lewis A. Kornhauser
W. Bentley MacLeod 




Lewis A. Kornhauser 
New York University School of Law  
 















P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  







Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 














Contracts between Legal Persons
* 
 
Contract law and the economics of contract have, for the most part, developed independently 
of each other. In this essay, we briefly review the notion of a contract from the perspective of 
lawyer, and then use this framework to organize the economics literature on contract. The 
title, Contracts between Legal Persons, limits the review to that part of contract law that is 
generic to any legal person. A legal person is any individual, firm or government agency with 
the right to enter into binding agreements. Our goal is to discuss the role of the law in 
enforcing these agreements under the hypothesis that the legal persons have well defined 
goals and objectives. 
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1 Introduction
Contract law and the economics of contract have, for the most part, developed independently
of each other. While contract law has existed for centuries, if not millenia, the economic
analysis of contract is both very recent and largely divorced from the content and structure
of contract law.1 Current reviews of contract theory, such as Laﬀont and Maritmort (2002)
and Bolton and Dewatripont (2005), for example, do not discuss either the substantive law
of contract or the role that courts play in enforcement. In this essay, we begin to bridge this
gap.
We brieﬂy review the notion of a contract from the perspective of a lawyer, and then use
this framework to organize the economics literature on contract. The review thus provides
an overview of the literature for economists who are interested in exploring the economic
implications of contract law. The title, Contracts between Legal Persons, limits the review to
that part of contract law that is generic to any legal person. A legal person is any individual,
ﬁrm or government agency with the right to enter into a binding agreement. Our goal is to
discuss the role of the law in enforcing these agreements under the hypothesis that the legal
persons have welldeﬁned goals and objectives.2
The possession of well-deﬁned preferences does not imply that legal persons never make
mistakes. In fact, a key ingredient to understanding the observed form of contract law
requires the introduction of some imperfections in decision making. Since the seminal work
of Herbert Simon, there has been little disagreement that a complete understanding of human
institutions requires the incorporation of errors in decision making, however, there is little
agreement regarding the best way to achieve this goal. In this review, we follow the widely
accepted hypothesis that imperfect and asymmetric information are key ingredients of any
theory of contract form. We show that these elements are suﬃcient to tie together the various
strands of the literature. We then outline a plan for future research.
The review is divided into three substantive parts. The next section focuses upon the
1The introduction of Laﬀont and Maritmort (2002) provides a nice historical overview of the development
of incentives contracts.
2For example, the ﬁeld of corporate governance (see Hermalin (2011)) is concerned with the design of
legal institutions that ensure that ﬁrms have preferences that correspond to maximizing ﬁrm value.
2primary legal concepts on which contract law rests – including the notion of a legal person
and what is meant by an enforceable agreement. We focus on the substantive remedial
regime that determines how contracts are enforced and on two features of the process of
adjudication – fact-ﬁnding and interpretation – that determine what obligations the parties
have and when they have been breached.
Part 3 examines how the implicit assumptions underlying the economic literature on con-
tract compares to the substantive law of remedy. Economic models of contract make stylized
assumptions regarding how the law enforces contracts. In many cases, these assumptions are
consistent with existing law. In some cases, particularly when the contract requires a person
to act in a particular way, the implicit assumptions are inconsistent with existing law in
jurisdictions such as the United States. This inconsistency is manifest in some recent work
that builds upon results in mechanism design. The same inconsistency may help explain, as
Jean Tirole (1999) observes, the gap between the predictions of these models and observed
contract forms. In addition, section 3 discusses the literature in economic analysis of law that
begins to bridge the gap between the spare assumptions on remedial regime in the economic
literature and the complexity of the law.
Section 4 discusses the sparse literature on fact-ﬁnding and interpretation. This literature
asks two questions:
1. When parties write an incomplete contract, how should a court determine the obliga-
tions that the parties have?
2. How do courts ﬁnd facts? In terms of the economic literature, what is the technology
of veriﬁcation?
Section 5 concludes.
We deploy the conceptual scheme of contract law summarized in section 2.2 to organize
a summary of the literature on the economics of contract. Our characterizations of some of
the underlying economics literature may thus seem a bit askew,but we hope that the legal
perspective will open additional avenues of research.
2 Contract Law
In this section, we set out the legal view of contract. We begin with the legal view of agency
for two reasons. First, it provides a sharp contrast with the economic view. Second, as
most contracts are between ﬁrms, we require a conception of a ﬁrm and when a transaction
3is between ﬁrms rather than within a ﬁrm. Our conception of a ﬁrm will rely on some
basic legal concepts that have consequences for the legal treatment of diﬀerent types of
transactions. We proceed in the second subsection to a characterization of contract law.
2.1 Legal Personality
The economic agent is characterized by her preferences; the legal agent is characterized by
her legal capacities to hold and convey property, to make contracts, and to sue and be
sued. These capacities are central to each of the diﬀerent legal forms that a ﬁrm might take:
sole proprietorship, partnership, business corporation, trust, or not-for-proﬁt corporation.3
Natural persons (who have reached the age of majority and are mentally competent) also
have these properties. Hansmann (2011) discusses the importance of asset ownership (and,
implicitly, some aspects of exposure to suit). As Hansmann notes, legal personality segregates
a set of assets owned by the entity. Consider for example a corporation C. C owns some
set of assets A that are subject to claims from other persons. Liability of C is limited (to
the asset pool A) because the corporate form protects the assets of other legal persons, in
particular, the owners of C, from valid legal claims against C.4
We focus on the legal person’s right to make contracts and to sue and be sued. Legal
persons act through natural persons. When the legal person is simply a natural person, both
action and identiﬁcation of which acts are attributable to her is relatively straightforward.
Many legal persons, however, are complex; they are constituted by and encompass large
numbers of other legal persons, both natural and artiﬁcial. For example, law ﬁrms thirty
years ago were typically organized as partnerships. Each partner was a natural person as were
all employees of the partnership (but not all its clients, many of whom were corporations).
Some actions of the partners and their employees were attributable to the partnerships
and others not. Similarly, a business corporation has shareholders, managers, directors,
employees, and customers; some members of each of these classes may be natural persons
but others may be corporations. It may also own, wholly or in part, other corporations.
Corporations, of course, act only through individuals, some but not all of whose acts are
attributable to the corporation.
3The attributes of legal personality of the diﬀerent forms of business organization vary somewhat. So, for
example, partnerships are not treated as “persons” for tax purposes while corporations are. More importantly,
a partnership can be terminated at will by any partner at any time while corporate death (or dissolution) is
more complex. For a brief introduction to the concept of legal personality see Clark (1986),section 1.2.3.
4The protection of assets of other legal persons is not complete. In some circumstances, a claimant T on
C’s assets may either “pierce the corporate veil” and make claims against the assets of the owner of C when
A is insuﬃcient to satisfy T’s claim or claim assets that have been transferred to third parties..
4Two bodies of law solve these problems of attribution: organizational law and agency law.
Organizational law addresses problems of the internal organization of the ﬁrm or legal person.
Often, in conjunction with constitutional documents of the ﬁrm – in business corporations the
articles of incorporation and the by-laws, organizational law identiﬁes a decision procedure
for the ﬁrm. In business corporations, this decision procedure is complex, with ﬁnal authority
for most decisions given to the board of directors though some decisions require shareholder
approval and many decisions are delegated to management.5 The law of agency determines
which actions may bind the legal persons. Under what circumstances, is the ﬁctitious person
responsible for the acts of its agents such as employees? Even a natural person might beneﬁt
from having an agent, someone who can enter contracts for her and make other decisions.
The law of agency governs which actions of the agent belong to the agent and which to the
principal.6 We ignore here actions that lead to harm to third parties and focus on exchange.7
If the agent has actual or apparent authority8 to act on behalf of the principal (here the
legal person), then the principal is bound by the agent’s actions while, generally, the agent
has no liability to the contracting party. The principal grants authority either expressly or
impliedly; in some instances, it may appear that the agent has authority even when she does
not. Agency law places the risk of error on the principal. In what follows, we shall generally
assume that the legal person acts through agents with actual authority.
Legal persons may also sue or be sued. We might diﬀerentiate contracts between ﬁrms
from contracts between the ﬁrm and its employees and from contracts between parts of the
ﬁrm in terms of the remedies available to resolve disputes. In essence, the law treats this
last class of transactions – transactions internal to the ﬁrm (but not employment contracts)9
5On corporate law generally, see Clark (1986).
6Clark section 3.3 oﬀers a brief introduction to agency principles. See also Institute (2006)
7When an individual acts as an agent on behalf of someone else, two questions arise. We emphasize the
question raised in the text: under what circumstances is the principal responsible for the acts of its agents?
This question might arise in at least two contexts: contract and tort. In the ﬁrst case, agency law generally
determines when the acts of the agent bind the principal to contracts that the agent makes on her behalf.
When an agent harms a third party, tort liability arises and the doctrine of vicarious liability determines
when the tort victim also has a claim against the principal. For economic analysis of vicarious liability see
Kornhauser (1982), Sykes (1981) and Arlen and MacLeod (2005).
The second question asks under what circumstances is the agent relieved of responsibility for her actions.
Again, the analysis of contract and tort diﬀers. Usually, agents are not responsible to the promisee for the
contracts that they enter on behalf of their principals. They might, however, be liable to the principal if
they acted outside the scope of their authority. See Restatement (third) of Agency sections 6.01, 6.04, 6.10,
6.11. In tort, agents generally are responsible for actions that harm third parties though public oﬃcials in
the United States beneﬁt from a qualiﬁed immunity from tort liability for actions taken in furtherance of
their oﬃcial duties. See generally Institute (2006) section 7.01
8On apparent authority see Institute (2006) section 3.03
9Contracts between the ﬁrm and its employees are generally governed by contract law, employment law,
5– diﬀerently from market transactions. Several distinct questions arise here. Consider some
actor X. We may ask ﬁrst: What rights does X have? Second, what forum is available
to adjudicate these rights? More speciﬁcally, are state courts available to adjudicate these
rights? Third, and ﬁnally, if state courts are available, is X able to assert these rights in
this forum? In any given dispute, the law provides complex answers to these questions. We
provide a brief sketch of the legal terrain (in the United States) with respect to disputes
arising from exchange.
In economics, a legal person C is usually a business corporation though, in some contexts,
C might be a natural person or a governmental entity. Suppose C is a business corporation.
Hence, C has relations with its employees and its subsidiaries, both sets of which are sets of
legal persons, with outside ﬁrms and with outside consumers. Disputes may thus arise from
interactions among employees or subsidiaries or groups of employees, or between agents of
the ﬁrm and outside suppliers or consumers.
The ﬁrst question concerns the substantive rights the disputants have. The legal per-
son to a large extent makes its own law to govern its internal disputes; Williamson (1991)
makes this point. Thus, our corporation C has the power to determine, within limits,10 the
substantive rights that employees and subsidiaries have against it and the substantive rights
that employees and subsidiaries have against each other. C’s power to makes its own law,
however, may be limited by state law or state law may create a set of default rules to govern
without explicit internal law. Employment law provides a good example. Internal rules may
not violate employment discrimination rules and the doctrine of at-will employment serves
as a default rule in most jurisdictions in the United States. Of course, C and the outside
ﬁrms with which it contracts also have the power, subject to the same caveats, to make their
own law to govern their exchange; this power is granted by contract law.
Turn now to the second question of forum. Suppose two persons A and B, employees
or subsidiaries of C, have a dispute arising under C’s internal rules. As the employment
contract usually delegates authority to the ﬁrm, the state courts will not resolve this dispute
(unless the dispute implicates some statutory right of the employee). Nor would the parent
corporation usually allow its subsidiaries to resort to the courts to resolve an internal dispute.
Now consider two unincorporated divisions D and D’ of C. Neither D nor D’ is a legal
or labor law.
10Contract law provides the parties with great latitude in structuring their relationship but other parts of
state law do constrain the substantive rights. The Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States bans slavery, for instance. More relevantly, U.S. law includes statutes that require equal treatment by
race, gender, age, and disability as well as restrictions on minimum wages and various terms and conditions
of employment.
6person for purposes of state law. However, even if they have engaged in an exchange with
an "outsider" that constitutes a contract, neither D nor D’ has the power to sue or be sued
with respect to such a claim. To be concrete, suppose Chevrolet and Pontiac, both unin-
corporated subdivisions of General Motors, jointly hire an advertising ﬁrm; the agreement
between Chevrolet and Pontiac provides a formula for allocating the costs incurred by the
advertising ﬁrm. Any dispute between Chevrolet and Pontiac must be resolved within Gen-
eral Motors. (If Chevrolet and Pontiac were corporate subsidiaries of General Motors, each
with a distinct legal identity, then each would have the right to sue or be sued. General
Motors, however, might prohibit its subsidiaries from exercising this right.) One may view
many of the contributions to this handbook (for exampleHansmann (2011)) as reviews of
the internal procedures and policies that ﬁrms use to govern internal disputes.
2.2 The Law of Contract
2.2.1 Deﬁning the Basic Concepts
A contract, in the legal literature, is “an agreement between two or more parties creating
obligations that are enforceable or otherwise recognizable at law.”11 The economic literature,
by contrast, provides no deﬁnition of a contract.12 To the economist, “contract” refers to an
incentive structure, often an optimal or constrained optimal incentive structure.13
Fruitful interchange between the two literatures thus requires that we specify at the
outset a common vocabulary that permits the introduction of a legal framework into the
economic analysis of “contract”. We introduce four concepts: an exchange environment, a
11Black’s Law Dictionary. The Restatement Second of Contracts, section 1, oﬀers a similar deﬁnition: a
promise or set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy or the performance of which the law
in some way recognizes as a duty”. On this issue speciﬁcally, and on contract law generally, see Farnsworth
(1999).
Diﬀerent legal systems have diﬀerent criteria for determining the set of agreements that the law will
enforce. In common law jurisdictions such as the United States and Britain, these constraints are few. The
agreement must be suﬃciently detailed for the court to determine the content of the bargain; in most cases an
agreement that required the transfer of goods at some future date without specifying the quality or quantity
of the goods or the price at transfer would be unenforceable. In addition, for a promise to perform a future
action to constitute an agreement, the promisee must give “consideration” but almost any return promise or
action is now understood as consideration. See generally Farnsworth (1999) sections 2.2 -2.4. Note also that
some agreements must be in writing to be enforceable.
12The index to Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) has no entry for contract law and the text provides no
formal deﬁnition. The index to Salanie (1997) does have an entry “contract, deﬁnition of” but the designated
page does not provide a clear deﬁnition.
13Salanie’s discussion in his introduction is consistent with this interpretation. Ayres and Gertner (1992)
characterize the economic literature in a similar fashion.
7contractual instrument, contract law and contractual behavior. We will then oﬀer a deﬁnition
of a contract.
An exchange environment is speciﬁed by the preferences of the agents, the information
structure among the agents and any third party enforcer, and the production technology
that determines the eﬀects of various investments by the parties on the costs and beneﬁts of
exchange. The exchange environment identiﬁes the constraints under which the agents act.
A contractual instrument contains the terms the parties bargained for; while contract law
may imply terms that the parties have neglected to make explicit, interpret terms that, in
the light of performance, are ambiguous, or, more rarely, impose a term contrary to the one
negotiated by the parties; further, the remedial rules of contract law largely determines the
structure of any renegotiation. Contractual behavior refers to the actions of parties to the
contract in light of the contractual instrument and the prevailing law of contract. We reserve
the term “contract” for the set of obligations that result from the application of contract law
to the contractual instrument.
We may think of a contractual instrument as a (partial) list of events and associated
obligations for each party. Though the law usually enforces oral agreements, we assume
that the agreement has a written form. Thus, a contractual instrument is embodied in a
ﬁxed text that is publicly available so that the parties and any third party enforcer know
the contents of this text. The contractual instrument in conjunction with contract law
determine the contractual obligations the parties have. We might say, that is, that the
contractual instrument as understood against the background law of contract determines
the contract between the parties. This contract is, in the sense of Arrow and Debreu, a
complete contingent claims contract; it speciﬁes what each party must do in every possible
state of the world though, of course, the speciﬁed actions may not be optimal ones.
This essay begins to disentangle the role of the contractual instrument from the role of
contract law in the structure of mechanisms. We also specify the constraints that contract
law imposes on mechanism design by articulating some of the real features of contract law.
2.2.1 What does contract law do?
One ambiguity remains in our vocabulary. Contract law refers both to the substantive
rules governing contracting behavior and to the institutions that interpret and enforce them.
Substantive contract law identiﬁes what private parties must do to create a legally bind-
ing agreement and guides the courts in the interpretation and enforcement of contractual
instruments. In this essay, we focus on two institutional aspect of contract law that charac-
8terize the tasks of courts and on a subset of the substantive law of contract. In eﬀect, the
court performs three distinct tasks when it adjudicates a contract dispute. First, it ﬁnds
the facts. It determines what actions the parties took and what state of the world or nature
was realized. Second, it interprets the contractual instrument. Interpretation requires the
court to determine what obligations the contractual instrument imposed in the realized state
of the world.14 If the contractual instrument was complete, coherent, and uncontradictory,
some term speciﬁed these obligations. If the contractual instrument was incomplete, the
contractual instrument will not have speciﬁed any obligations in the realized state of the
world. In this case, the court must nonetheless determine the obligations of the parties. In
other instances, the contractual instrument may be poorly drafted and impose conﬂicting or
ambiguous obligations in some state of the world.15Again, the court must determine what
obligations the parties actually have. Third, if the court determines that one or more parties
has failed to meet its obligations under the contractual instrument, as interpreted by the
court, it must enforce the contract; the court imposes the remedy dictated by the substantive
law.16 Remedies may take many forms. The substantive rules of contract law determine the
form of the remedy.
This discussion of the functions of courts suggests that we assess regimes of contract law
along three diﬀerent axes – the process of fact determination, the interpretative practice,
and the substantive remedial regime.
2.2.2 Fact Finding
A contractual instrument speciﬁes, against the legal backdrop, the obligations of each party.
Often the obligations of the parties are state-contingent; what each party must do varies with
the state of the world. Resolution of every contract dispute thus requires determination of
the actions that each party took and of the realized event.
Fact-ﬁnding procedures apply across a wide of range of types of disputes and they are
governed by distinct bodies of law (that generally go under the names of civil or criminal
14Of course, the content of the contract instrument and the substance of contract law determine in part
what facts the court must ﬁnd.
15A poorly drafted contractual instrument might, in one or more contingencies, also specify an ineﬃcient
or otherwise inappropriate obligation. Some poorly drafted contracts impose in some events inconsistent
obligations on a party. I.e., it requires the party both to do and not to do some act A.
16“Impose a remedy” here means announce a judgment for the plaintiﬀ/promisee that speciﬁes an amount
of damages to be paid or an action to be taken by the defendant/promisor. If the defendant does not satisfy
the judgment, the plaintiﬀ must return to court for an order to direct the sheriﬀ to seize assets suﬃcient
to satisfy the damage award or to seize the defendant as in contempt of court. Thus, strictly speaking, the
sheriﬀ, not the court, enforces remedies.
9procedure and evidence). We may assess these procedures along two dimensions: their
accuracy and their cost. In an ideal world, fact-ﬁnding would be perfectly accurate and
costless. In the real world, the invocation of courts is costly and courts themselves sometimes
err in their fact ﬁnding.17
As we discuss below, the economic theory of contract generally distinguishes observable
actions from veriﬁable actions. Courts costlessly observe veriﬁable actions with perfect
accuracy; courts cannot observe unveriﬁable actions at any cost.18 Most actions and events,
by contrast, are only veriﬁable at some cost and to some degree of accuracy.
2.2.3 Interpretive Practices
Contract disputes often entail more than a dispute over facts. They often include disputes
over the content of the contractual obligations the parties faced. A party’s obligations may
be unclear for several reasons: the contractual instrument may have been ambiguous so that
it is unclear whether an action a satisﬁes the contractually speciﬁed obligation or not; the
contractual instrument may have been inconsistent and required that the party undertake
an action that was not feasible in the realized state of the world or that the party undertake
inconsistent actions; or the contractual instrument may not have contemplated the realized
state of the world and so speciﬁed no obligation at all. Finally, contract law itself may have
been unclear or ambiguous.
Contract interpretation is the legal practice that determines the obligations of the par-
ties. These practices are complex and diﬃcult to specify. To begin, we consider a procedural
aspect of interpretive practices: the information on which the court relies in deciding what
obligations the parties have under the contractual instrument.19 The practice may be more
or less inclusive in its informational base. It might refer only to the ﬁxed text of the con-
tractual instrument or it might rely on additional information. It might for instance rely
on statements during the pre-contractual negotiations of the parties. It might rely on the
pre-contractual practice (if any) of the parties – i.e., it might look to prior behavior of the
parties under contractual instruments dealing with the same or similar subject matter. The
court might look to the course of dealing of the parties under the contractual instrument
in dispute. Alternatively, the court might look to general trade practice; that is, the court
might consider how individuals who regularly engage in exchange of the type governed by
17We note in passing that the parties may, in the contractual instrument, alter the usual, default fact-
ﬁnding procedures.
18The economic literature treats unveriﬁable actions as a constraint on the contractual instrument.
19Katz (2004) discusses this issue.
10the disputed contractual instrument behaved under similar circumstances. We distinguish
textualist practices of interpretation in which the court refers only to the written text of the
contractual instrument from contextualist practices of interpretation in which the court refers
to some information external to the contractual instrument as well as the text. This simple
distinction is suﬃcient to classify the existing literature, discussed in section 4.2 below, and
which has been inattentive to the problem of interpretation.
Of course, even courts that adopt identical informational bases might have diﬀerent
interpretive practices. After all, an interpretive practice is a map from the space deﬁned by
the informational base into the set of obligations. Court C might impute one obligation to
a given set of “facts” while court C’ imputes a distinct obligation to the same set of “facts.”
We may better understand these imputation practices by considering the diﬀerent objec-
tives a court might pursue in interpreting the relevant informational base. The court might
pursue at least three diﬀerent objectives. It might seek to determine what the parties agreed
to (or, if they did not contemplate the realized event, would have agreed to). To accomplish
this aim, a court must recover both the interests of the parties and their relative bargaining
power.20 Alternatively, the court might seek to determine what “normal” or “average” parties
to exchanges of this type would agree to. To accomplish this aim, the court must determine
the preferences of the “normal” contracting parties. Third, the court might seek to determine
an “eﬃcient” contract. Eﬃciency here might refer to ex ante incentives to invest or it might
refer to eﬃcient risk sharing. Again the court needs to recover or to impute the preferences
of the parties.
In the stylized world of the economics of contract literature, the parties are rational;
they would themselves thus write an eﬃcient contract. It might thus appear that the third
interpretive aim simply recapitulates either of the prior two aims. This appearance however
is deceptive for two reasons. First, though rational parties would seek to maximize their
surplus, they might divide that surplus in many diﬀerent ways. Hence, the ﬁrst two aims
require the court to infer the nature of a speciﬁc bargain.
Second, the contractual instruments of rational parties are thus clear and well-speciﬁed.
In the commercial world, however, parties are not fully rational; they may make mistakes.
Consequently, contract terms may be vague, unclear or contradictory (in the sense of requir-
ing a party to take inconsistent actions in some state of the world. The court, in interpreting
the contractual instrument, must confront these imperfections and determine what obliga-
tions the parties in fact had under the contract.
20In fact, the court needs a complete theory of how the parties would bargain.
112.2.4 Remedial Regimes
After the court determines what happened and what obligations the parties had under
the contractual instrument, it determines whether each party met its obligations under the
contractual instrument (as interpreted under the prevailing contract law). If the court ﬁnds
that some party did not perform as required, it oﬀers a remedy. Again, contract law has a
rich set of remedial rules. We might understand a remedial regime as giving the promisor
an option: to perform or not to perform but to make a damage payment. Remedial regimes
diﬀer in the option price, or the level of damages that the promisor must pay in the event of
non-performance. We contrast two remedial regimes: (expectation) damages and no damages
(against a backdrop of secure property rights).21
The standard remedy22 for breach of contract in common law jurisdictions is expectation
damages.23 The principle of expectations damages awards the promisee her (subjective) value
of performance. Of course, the court generally cannot observe this subjective valuation; the
common law has developed a number of clever rules to implement the principle that, in many
cases, contrive to deliver to the promisee her subjective value of performance without actually
measuring it.24 In many cases, however, the actual measure of promisee’s expectation leads
to undercompensation. This undercompensation results in part from the procedural rule in
the United States that each party bears her own costs of litigation. This practice contrasts
with the practice in Britain where the losing party bears the winner’s costs of litigation as
well as paying substantive damages.
Expectation damages nevertheless applies to most agreements. It diﬀers dramatically
21Hermalin et al. (2006) surveys the economic literature on contractual remedies.
22Two types of deviations may occur. In some cases, lesser damages may be imposed and in some cases,
speciﬁc performance, discussed in note below, may be imposed. In addition, the remedial rules of contract
law are, to a certain extent, default rules. The parties may specify a level of damages in the contractual
instrument that would substitute for the court measurement.
23In civil law countries, there is a large group of contracts for which the default remedy is speciﬁc per-
formance, a requirement that the non-performing party meet her obligation. This requirement might be
enforced by charging the breaching party with civil contempt which, in common law countries, might lead
to jail time, or to large ﬁnes.
24Consider, for example, the rule of “cover” which permits an aggrieved buyer to purchase the contracted-
for goods on the spot market and to receive as damages the diﬀerence between the market price at which she
covered and the contract price. This rule delivers the promisee her expectation by delivering her the goods
at the contract price (on the assumption that the contracted-for goods were standardized goods available in
a suﬃciently “thick” spot market).
Notice that, generally, the law may oﬀer a number of diﬀerent remedial options from which the aggrieved
party may choose. Section 7 of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code illustrates both the panoply of
options and the elective nature well. In addition, an aggrieved party might rely on either restitution or
promissory estoppel rather than pure contract remedies.
12from the common assumption in the economics of contract literature that the obligation
speciﬁed in the contractual instrument will be enforced. The rule of expectation damages
will lead to radically diﬀerent consequences than the rule of perfect enforcement assumed in
the economics of contract literature.25
Finally, the law may simply protect the property rights of the parties and not enforce any
agreements at all. In this regime, the parties have no access to the fact-ﬁnding or interpretive
capacities of courts. Courts do, however, protect persons against bodily harm and property
from appropriation by other individuals (and the government). When a promisor fails to
perform, the promisee can enforce the contract only through reputational devices or refusals
to deal. This regime corresponds to a regime of pure “relational” contracts.
2.2.5 Concluding remarks
These brief comments suggest a rich panoply of regimes of contract law against which ex-
change might occur. We consider a few ideal types, all against a backdrop of security of
property rights. At the extremes are anarchy and utopia, the two regimes commonly as-
sumed in the economics of contract. Under anarchy, there is no third-party fact-ﬁnding,
interpretation, or enforcement though each party remains secure in her property holdings.
Under utopia, fact-ﬁnding is perfectly accurate and costless, interpretation is clear and cost-
less, and enforcement is costless and perfect (in the sense that each party performs her stated
obligation). In the world of anarchy, contracts must be self-enforcing; in utopia, the parties
can costlessly bind themselves to any obligation they choose.
Courts, however, decide cases in neither an anarchic nor an utopian world but in a
world in which fact-ﬁnding, interpretation and enforcement are both costly and error-ridden.
Contracts here need not be self-enforcing but they will not be perfectly enforced. Observed
contracts reﬂect this middle ground (as well as the oddities that result from the eﬀorts of
boundedly rational or irrational agents).26
25As noted above, courts applied the remedy of speciﬁc performance to contracts for “unique” goods.
One might, however, understand the rule of speciﬁc performance as an instance (or implementation) of the
expectation principle as, by delivering the contracted-for performance, delivers the promisee her expectation.
At will employment, by contrast, does not deliver the value of the performance to the agent.
26We have ignored some complications that arise when parties are insolvent. Our discussion thus far has
assumed that the promisor is fully solvent; it can meet all claims on it. Under this assumption, the promisee
understands that the promisor will either perform or pay damages as measured by the contract rule. In many
actual transactions, however, and in some models, the promisor is potentially insolvent. Insolvency triggers
a shift in the set of legal rules that govern disputes over contracts. Fried (1996) sets out the rules governing
contracts in bankruptcy. He argues that the rules provide the trustee in bankruptcy with incentives to reject
some contracts with expected gains from trade.
133 Enforcement and Remedy in Economic Models of Con-
tract
In this section, we examine the enforcement assumptions implicit in the economic litera-
ture on contract. Economic analyses of contract usually make one of three assumptions.
The literature on relational contracts assumes that the parties have no remedies available
to them, other than the enforcement of unconditional monetary transfers. The agency lit-
erature assumes, consistent, with the substantive legal regime, that an aggrieved party will
receive compensation equal to her expectation from the contract. The incomplete contracts
literature, by contrast, assumes than an aggrieved party will receive speciﬁc performance; i.e
that the courts will enforce all terms in the contract as written. As we discuss in more de-
tail below, speciﬁc performance is not the general remedial rule in Anglo-American common
law systems, and hence several of the contract forms that have been suggested as eﬃcient
solutions to the hold-up problems could not be implemented in the United States.
It is worth pointing out that in economics, the only role that damages play is to en-
sure that individuals choose to perform their obligations. Kornhauser (1983) observes that
contract damages can play a second role, namely to encourage careful planning by parties.
However, this point requires a theory of endogenously incomplete contracts, a relatively new
literature. This is discussed further in section 4.
In section 3.1 we consider relational contracts. Section 3.2 discusses the general question
of remedy. Section 3.3 considers expectation damages. These are damages that require the
harmed party to pay the plaintiﬀ an amount equal in value to the loss suﬀered by the breach.
Section 3.4 examines liquidated damages. In these clauses, the contracting parties specify
Consider a contract at time t0 between a Seller S and a Buyer B for the delivery of one widget at a price
p at time t2. Suppose S ﬁles for bankruptcy at time t1; S is insolvent. If the contract was performed by
both parties prior to t1there is no problem. Suppose therefore that S has not performed by t1. There are
two possibilities: (a) B has fully performed prior to t1 or (b) B has not fully performed by t1(in which
case the contract is executory). In situation (a), B is an unsecured creditor with no priority over any other
unsecured creditors. Of course, Buyer may have taken a security interest in some asset of S’s; then Buyer
would have a prior claim on that asset. In principle, an economic analysis of contracting must now ask under
what circumstances would we expect to see either party take a security interest in some asset? Turn now to
situation (b). S faces a choice. She may either assume the contract or reject it. If she rejects the contract,
then B is once again treated as an unsecured creditor of S. If S, however, assumes the contract, there are
again two possibilities. S might perform the assumed contract in which case there is no problem; or S might
later breach the contract. (At the time t1 of the bankruptcy, the market price for widgets might be p 2; S
therefore makes a proﬁt by assuming the contract. At t2, though, the market price may have risen to p + 2
and S might do better if she breaches.) If S breaches subsequent to assumption of the contract, then B is an
unsecured creditor of S but she now has priority over unsecured creditors whose debts were incurred prior
to bankruptcy.
14their own remedial regime. Section 3.5 discusses the remedy of speciﬁc performance. Section
3.6 compares expectation damages and speciﬁc performance. Section 3.7 provides a brief
summary.
3.1 Relational Contracts and the absence of a remedial regime
Relational contracts use the threat to terminate a relationship as a contract enforcement
device.27 The literature here has antecedents in both the legal and the economic literature.
In a classic study in the sociology of law, Macaulay (1963) observed that many business
relationships appear to work well, even though they have no formal contract, or the contrac-
tual instrument they have is extremely unclear or inconsistent.28 The evidence in Macaulay
(1963) suggests that parties performed because of the expectation of future business rather
than because of the threat of legal remedies.29
Simon (1951)’s classic paper on employment contracts initiated the economic literature
on relational contracts. Simon was not concerned with the enforceability of the contract, but
how complexity can lead to one or the other contract form. Malcomson (1981) begins his
analysis of the employment contract with the observation that the complexity of performance
requirements makes it impossible to enforce performance standards.30 This creates a problem
of ex post holdup (MacLeod (2002)). Malcomson (1981) points out that legal enforcement
of employment contracts is limited; the ﬁrm must pay an employment who arrives at work
but the court will not generally assess the quality of the employee’s labor. Hence, dismissal
is the sole sanction available to the employer. This characterization is consistent with the
common law rule of employment at will.31
These ideas have resulted in a large literature on “relational contracts” that builds on
the hypothesis that courts cannot be relied upon to enforce sanctions conditional upon the
performance of complex tasks. Employment-at-will is the common law default rule in the
United States but not generally in other jurisdictions. Moreover, even in the United States
the law has evolved a number of exceptions to at-will employment that allow employees to
seek damages from employers (Miles (2000)). Though some recent literature explores the
27Malcomson (2011) and MacLeod (2007) for detailed reviews of the literature on relational contracts.
28This confusion can occur when buyer uses her own purchase order and seller uses his own invoice, each of
which includes boilerplate terms. This practice leads to the famous “battle of the forms” problem in contract
law. See 3.21 in Farnsworth (1999).
29See also Posner (1997) for a discussion of the role of norms, and how they may shape behavior in
contractual relationships
30Page 852.
31See Feinman (1978) for a history of evolution of the doctrine of employment at will.
15role of employment protection in labor market performance (MacLeod (2010)), for the most
part, the economics literature equates employment law with a turnover tax.32 As we observe
above, one of the important roles of the courts is its fact ﬁnding function, and hence equating
employment law with a turnover tax is a rather crude representation of the legal system.
The formal analysis of relational contracts begins with Telser (1980), who introduced the
idea that a relational contract can be modeled as a repeated game. He shows that if both
parties have suﬃcient gains from trade, then they will both perform when the consequence of
non-performance is a cessation of trade. His model assumes that both parties might breach
the contract, and that this event is observable by both parties. Though Telser does not use all
the formalism of repeated game theory, his analysis is consistent with the characterizations
of the equilibria of repeated games in Abreu (1988).
Abreu (1988) shows that one can characterize all equilibria in a repeated game with a
two step procedure. First, parties agree upon the equilibrium action in each period. In the
context of a contract, this stage can be viewed as specifying the performance obligations.
Next, Abreu shows that this “agreement” can be the outcome of playing a sub-game perfect
equilibrium if, in every period, parties cannot gain by not performing, and then playing the
worst subgame perfect equilibrium for the cheater. In other words, when breach occurs, the
non-performing party faces the worst equilibrium possible under the rules of the game.
In this framework, the eﬃciency of an agreement is constrained by the size of the possible
punishment. The folk theorem formalized the idea that, as the frequency of interaction
increases, eventually the gain from cheating is less than the cost, and hence an eﬃcient
agreement can be reached. In this theory, the discount rate between periods represents the
frequency of interaction. In this class of models increasing the discount rate is equivalent to
holding the volume of trade constant per period, and having more transactions of smaller
value within a single period. In that case, the cost of cheating does not change, but the since
the value of each individuals transactions is smaller, the gain from breach falls.
A crucial assumption is breach can be perfectly observed. One might wonder whether the
set of feasible allocations depends upon the allocation of the cost of cheating between the two
parties. MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) showed that only the total gains from future trade
aﬀect the set of feasible allocations. By carefully designing the breach obligation, combined
with a bonus payment by the buyer to the seller at the end of each period, parties can choose
any allocation of the surplus.
32Blanchard and Tirole (2008) provide a nice analysis of employment policy for the purposes of informing
French public policy. They they explicitly explore the role of employment insurance, and view employment
protection as mainly a turnover cost. The fact ﬁnding role of the courts is not discussed at all.
16When performance is not perfectly observable, the problem is much more complex. It
may no longer be optimal for one party always to perform. Consequently, it is no longer
optimal for the breaching party to face the maximal penalty. The modern theory of relational
contracts explores the interplay between uncertainty regarding the breach obligation, and the
possible punishments available in a relationship. In summary, the main technical diﬀerence
between the theory of damages under relational contracts and damages under contractual
instruments in the shadow of the law is that the maximal punishment under a relational
contract is limited by the potential gains from future trade. The insights of the contract
design and damages literature also apply to relational contract whenever the gains from
trade are suﬃciently large.
Before proceeding to our discussion of damages, it is worth while discussing two papers
that are often cited as examples of relational contracting, namely Klein and Leﬄer (1981)
and Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). These papers do not explicitly address the question of what
is an optimal contract. Rather they begin with an observed contract form, and then ask what
are the market implications if parties restrict themselves to this contractual instrument. In
the case of Klein and Leﬀer (1981) they consider the simple sales contract: seller sells a good
at a ﬁxed price. They then suppose that product quality is potentially imperfect, and that
the market can observe product quality in the past. They then explore the consequences
for a competitive market when buyers shun sellers who have produced low quality in the
past. They show that this shunning strategy implies that high quality sellers will have brand
names with positive rents associated with them. Sellers will choose not to supply low quality
for fear of losing the return on their brand name.
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) assume that ﬁrms oﬀer ﬁxed wage contracts, but have the
ability to dismiss workers at will. When there is uncertainty regarding worker performance,
or a delay in observing performance, then under such a contract employed workers must
earn higher utility than newly unemployed workers (and hence there is involuntary unem-
ployment). As MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) show, involuntary unemployment follows
from the assumption on contract form, and not from the assumption of costly monitoring
(see Carmichael (1989) for an excellent discussion of the issues). These papers illustrate
an important branch of the literature that explores the properties of observed contractual
instruments, and how features of the contractual instrument (mainly the price) vary with
characteristics of the environment (see the chapter by Lafontaine and Slade (2011)). For the
most part, it is still an open empirical question why some contract forms are chosen rather
than others.
173.2 Remedy Generally
Courts do not automatically enforce contracts, rather the party harmed by non-performance
invokes the court. As such, legal enforcement is more properly viewed as providing parties
with a set of decision rights. This idea has it origin in Aghion and Bolton (1992). They
observe that bankruptcy can be viewed as a situation in which the control rights to a ﬁrm
moves from the owners to the debt holders. Similarly, MacLeod (2007) observes that contract
breach can be viewed as providing the harmed party the right to seek damages in a court of
law.
Contract law determines the remedy available to an aggrieved party; the parties, through
the contract design, assign the right to invoke the court for non-performance. We can
illustrate the problem with a version of the simple buyer-seller example. We also use this
example to discuss remedies for contract breach.
Consider a buyer-seller relationship where the seller chooses a level of eﬀort/quality q > 0
that determines the probability (q;E) that there has been performance as a function of q,
and possibly other events E that occur after q is chosen. Let BP be the ex ante beneﬁt from
performance, and BB the ex ante beneﬁt if there is breach, and c(q) the cost to the seller of
performing (c(0) = 0;c0;c00 > 0). Given a price p, the payoﬀs to the buyer and seller are:
UB(q) = BP(q;E) + BB(1   (q;E))   rB   p;
US(q) = p   c(q)   rS:
The terms rS;rB  0 are the reliance expenditures made by the buyer and seller after the
after the contractual instrument has been signed, but before trade and production. These
investments provide a motivation for writing a contract, as formally modeled by Grout (1984)
and Hart and Moore (1988).
In addition to protecting investments, the contract must also provide appropriate incen-






Suppose that the buyer cannot directly observe eﬀort q; in which case we have a model that
is technically identical to a principal agent model with risk neutral agents, and hence, from
a contract theory perspective, trivial. We suppose that it is eﬃcient to trade, and hence any
18state contingent price is of the form:
ps = Bs   R; s 2 fP;Bg
eﬀectively shifts all the risk to the seller, and thus induces the seller to choose the eﬃcient
level of eﬀort. The term R is the rent that the buyer obtains from the relationship. It would
be set as a function of the relative ex ante bargaining power of the two parties.33
This contractual instrument is not a legal document – it merely speciﬁes the transfers
as a function of S’s decision to perform. It supposes either a costless legal system, or a
world where individuals do not breach their obligations. In practice, this agreement could
be implemented in a number of ways. Consider, for example, two contractual instruments
that could govern a simple exchange. The ﬁrst instrument is denoted by pA. It deﬁnes the
price that a buyer pays in advance in exchange for a promise by the seller to deliver a good
that conforms to the contract speciﬁcations. The second contractual instrument, pP, is the
price that the buyer promises to pay the seller upon delivery of a conforming good. Notice
that neither contractual instrument is complete in the sense that neither speciﬁes what will
happen in the event of breach. Nevertheless, these contractual instruments are very common
in practice, and courts are expected to be able to adjudicate the disputes that arise in these
cases.
Notice that, though these are very simple contractual instruments, they have quite dif-
ferent properties when viewed as contractual instruments. In the case of instrument pA, the
buyer has paid, and hence the performance obligation rests in the hands of the seller. If she
does not perform, then the buyer must sue and must take care to collect evidence regarding
the seller’s performance. Thus, it is the buyer who must make the investment to sue. If
the seller can be shown not to perform, then the courts must determine the appropriate
damages.
In the case of instrument pP the situation is reversed. In this case, once the seller has
performed, the buyer must perform her promise to pay. If not, then the seller would have to
sue the buyer to collect the amount due. Note that, in the second case, once performance
has been veriﬁed, then the question of damages is straightforward – the buyer is obliged to
pay the amount agreed upon, plus possibly any expenses arising from the delay in payment.
We will use these two generic contractual instruments to discuss the various remedies for
breach of contract that have been proposed by the literature.
33Under this contract we have: UB = R   rB and US = BP(q;E) + BB(1   (q;E))   R   rS   c(q).
193.3 Expectation Damages
The rule of expectation damages attempts to measure the loss arising from breach of contract.
In the case of contractual instrument pB, if the buyer does not pay, the loss to the seller is
pB, and hence, expectation damages provides the same remedy as speciﬁc performance. In
the case of contract pA, if the seller performs, the buyer obtains a return BP, and a return
of BB if there is breach. The loss due to breach would be D = BP  BB. As we can see from
1, this rule ensures that the seller has an incentive to choose eﬀort eﬃciently. Crocker and
Masten (1988) provides some evidence that in the case of long term gas contracts parties
prefer expectation damages as a way of ensuring eﬃcient ex post adaptation to changing
conditions.
The rule also provides an incentive for eﬃcient matching. For example, suppose that the
seller has another buyer of a good for whom the value is B0 > BP. If the seller breaches,
she would have to pay the buyer BP, but sell the good for B0, for a gain for B0   BP.
Thus she would breach whenever it is eﬃcient to do so.34 However, as Schwartz (1979)
observes, this well-known argument does not necessarily imply that speciﬁc performance
is ineﬃcient. In the absence of transactions costs, the seller could always renegotiate the
contract to share some of the gains from breach with the buyer.35 In practice this argument
is problematic because parties are unlikely to be truthful regarding their valuations, and
hence such renegotiation is not likely to be eﬃcient. Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) have
shown that even in the context of a simple exchange for a single good, if parties have private
information regarding their valuations and fully rational, then is impossible to obtain eﬃcient
trade in all cases. Ayres and Talley (1995) build upon this result to show how liability rules
should be chosen to enhance the eﬃciency of contract renegotiation.
The early literature on legal damage rules (Shavell (1980) and Rogerson (1984)) observes
that even though expectation damages result in eﬃcient breach, it may not provide appro-
priate incentives for relationship-speciﬁc investments. These papers are the beginning of a
signiﬁcant economics literature that compares the impact of remedies upon the eﬃciency of
a contractual instrument. This literature used the categorization of remedies by Fuller and
Perdue (1936). In that classic work they review the existing law and suggest that observed
remedies can be categorized into three types:
1. Value that the harmed party expected to obtain from the contract or expectation
34See Hermalin et al. (2006), section 5.2 for discussion of this well known result as well as a more compre-
hensive review of the literature on expectation damages, and related measures of damages.
35Alternatively, the second buyer could purchase from the original buyer.
20damages in both the legal and economic literatures.
2. The harmed party’s reliance upon the contract, generally measured by the speciﬁc
investment r. The economics literature terms these “reliance damages.”
3. Speciﬁc performance according to which the promisor is ordered to perform the obli-
gation.
The economics literature has accepted these three categories as the prototype representa-
tion of U.S. contract law. We have a series of papers, including Chung (1991), Spier and
Whinston (1995), Edlin (1996), Edlin and Reichelstein (1996), Che and Chung (1999), and
Schweizer (2006), that explore the relative eﬃciency of these three rules. This approach is
convenient because it allows one to carefully compare these rules under a variety of con-
ditions. Depending upon the environment, each of the damage rules may be eﬃcient, but
in general the rule of speciﬁc performance is typically found to the be the most eﬃcient,
consistent with prescriptions of legal scholars such as Schwartz (1979) and Ulen (1984). This
raises the obvious question of why the courts do not use speciﬁc performance.
To begin, Craswell (2000) observes that the damage rules used in economic models are
rather crude representation of the law. In the case of expectation damages the parties
could have avoided court costs by specifying in advance the monetary damages for breach, a
practice called liquidation damages. Moreover, a court cannot force the exchange of a good;
we need to ask exactly how to implement the doctrine of speciﬁc performance. Given that
the best the court can do is impose monetary penalties, why don’t the parties avoid court
costs by specifying such payments for all possible contingencies – in other words, why do
they leave gaps in a contract? Finally, advance speciﬁcation of the performance obligation is
not the only choice available to parties. The parties might instead delegate ex post authority
for certain decisions to one of the parties. How are such contracts enforced? In the next four
subsections we address each of these concerns in turn.
3.4 Liquidated Damages
Under contractual instrument pA the seller promises to perform, otherwise there is a breach
of contract. If there is non-performance the buyer would sue the seller, and under the rule
of expectation damages parties should expect a judgment equal to BP  BB. From equation
1, we see that this remedy provides ﬁrst best eﬀort incentives. Going to court to recover
BP  BB is an expensive exercise. If parties knew the outcome of a court case with certainty,
21then the costs of litigation could be avoided with an out of court settlement, the typical
outcome in practice.36
If the value of performance is private information, then from the Myerson and Satterth-
waite (1983) theorem, it may not be possible to avoid conﬂict and a court case. The parties
might adopt a number of solutions to this problem. First, the parties might specify liquidated
damages – the amount that the seller should pay in the event of non-performance. These
damages, speciﬁed in advance, provide a way for the buyer to signal to the seller her private
valuation. In principle, liquidated damages reduce the uncertainty associated with a court
case, and hence would increase the prospects for settlement.
In economics, liquidated damages is equivalent to a form of performance pay – the ex-
plicit linking of performance to compensation. However, these are two diﬀerent contractual
instruments. A liquidated damages clause substitutes the parties’ measure of damages for the
default judicial remedy of expectation damages. The clause direct the courts on the measure
of damages if breach occurs – if the seller supplies either no goods or the non-conforming
goods – and the buyer decides to litigate. In principle, the liquidated damages clause should
govern but a clause must satisfy several conditions to be enforceable; consequently, the court
has substantial discretion in the application of the clause. Indeed, the court will not enforce
penalty clauses – a liquidated damages clause that sets the amount of compensation too
high.37
In contrast, performance pay is a contractual obligation that leaves the court little dis-
cretion. If the seller supplies non-performing goods, that would not be a breach of contract
as long at the seller also makes the agreed upon compensation to the buyer. In this case,
breach of contract only occurs over promised transfers, a task for which the courts are gen-
erally competent. In economics, the principal-agent models rely exclusively upon contracts
of this type. This class of models covers a large part of the economics of contract, and so it
is worthwhile to discuss their enforceability.
Historically, principal-agent models build upon the theory of optimal risk bearing. Risk
averse individuals who face diversiﬁable risks are expected to purchase insurance. An insur-
ance contract speciﬁes payments to be made when certain events occur.38
36See Spier (2006).
37To be enforceable a liquidated damages clause must be set at a level that approximates actual damage
suﬀered and the amount of damages must be, at the time of formation of the contract, uncertain and hence
diﬃcult to anticipate. On liquidated damages generally see Institute (1981) section 375. Goetz and Scott
(1977) also provide an introduction to the law.
38The genesis of the principal-agent model is Arrow (1963)’s observation that, in the case of health care,
the government is in the best position to insure individuals against the costs of medical care in the event
22Agency contracts are particularly applicable to the procurement of services. A physical
good is one that can be delivered and inspected before the buyer accepts the good. However,
for services, production and delivery are simultaneous, and hence third parties can never
directly observe performance. Rather, one has signals of performance, which might include
the amount of apples harvested, monthly sales, number of customer complaints, the amount
by which students improve their test scores and so on. In each of these cases, the principal
can link compensation to a measure of performance. Such contracts are also very common
in employment. (MacLeod and Parent (1999) ﬁnd that more than 25% of US workers are
on some form of performance pay).
Holmström (1979) has shown that the optimal contract in a prototypical principal agent
model entails making compensation vary with any useful measure of performance. The
question then is whether such a contract is enforceable. In the case of commissions paid
to sales person there has been some litigation regarding the question of whether ﬁrms can
dismiss employees, and then not be required to pay commissions on sales that were completed
while the individuals was an employee.39 Many states in the United States have applied the
doctrine of good faith and fair dealing to such cases to rule that the ﬁrm did indeed have
an obligation to make good upon such promised payments. More generally, since agency
contracts typically require the principal to make monetary payments as a function of well
deﬁned events that are observable by the courts, then we would conclude that these contracts
are consistent with existing legal regime. We are sure that this conclusion is for our dear
reader, as it was for us, a great relief given the importance of agency theory in modern
economics.
3.5 Speciﬁc Performance
The economics literature generally assumes that contracts are enforceable in the sense that,
if a party has an obligation a, then the party will in fact do a. In legal terms, the economics
literature assumes that the default legal remedy is speciﬁc performance. The discussion in
the last section has indicated that this assumption is generally false. The standard, common
law remedy for breach of contract is expectation damages.
of an accident. However, Pauly (1968) observed that this policy recommendation overlooks an important
market incompleteness – namely these contracts do not control the level of care that individuals use to avoid
risks. He argued that insurance contracts create moral hazard – insured individuals have less incentive to
take precautions than uninsured persons. This observation spanned a large literature that today is called
either agency theory or the principal-agent problem. See chapter 4 of Bolton and Dewatripont (2005).
39See Miles (2000) for a discussion of these doctrines, and the extent to which performance contracts are
enforceable.
23Consider ﬁrst speciﬁc performance in the context of the sales contract given by pP at
which the buyer promises to pay pP upon delivery of the good. If Seller delivers and Buyer
fails to pay, speciﬁc performance merely requires the payment of a sum of money, a task
that the courts are competent to do. Notice that the ﬁrst best can be achieve with a price
pP = BP whenever (q;E)pP  c(q): Also notice that the remedy of expectation damages
would provide the same outcome.
Now consider the contractual instrument pA, where the seller promises to deliver a good
after payment has been made. Suppose Seller fails to deliver or delivers a good that is not of
the appropriate quality. What does speciﬁc performance mean in this case? If the contract
merely called for the transfer of physical or real property, then the courts could competently
enforce the transfer. In the case of real property they would simply order that a transfer has
occurred, and have this put into public record. At that point the new owner would simply
rely upon the Sheriﬀ’s oﬃce to enforce her ownership rights. In such cases the courts often
use speciﬁc performance as a remedy.40
What does speciﬁc performance mean when the courts cannot directly control the actions
of the seller? In these cases, the mechanism design literature, such as Aghion et al. (1994)
and Edlin and Reichelstein (1996), observes that the enforcement of speciﬁc performance
entails the (judicial) threat of penalties that are suﬃciently large that the parties choose to
perform as promised. 41 If it is the case that, at the eﬀort q, one has (q;E) = 1, then any
penalty greater than US(q)   US(0) = c(q) would ensure performance. Notice that this is





p; if q  q;
 C; if q < q:
(2)
Under this contract, the seller pays a penalty  C if performance is inadequate. Given that
rewards are deterministic, the seller can always choose to avoid the penalty by choose q.
Such a contract might make sense if the buyer wished to ensure performance for a wide
variety of costs to the seller. In the absence of a penalty, the seller might choose to default.
Such contracts are implicitly used in economic models where the goal is to implement a
price-quantity pair where this is possibly some asymmetric information (such as in Maskin
40See Farnsworth (1999). If the prior owner does not vacate the premises, the Sheriﬀ will, upon an
appropriate order of the court, evict. Similarly, if a losing defendant in a contract action fails to pay
the ordered expectation damages, the sheriﬀ, upon an appropriate court order, levy and execute on the
defendant’s assets to satisfy the judgment.
41See Edlin and Reichelstein (1996), page 482.
24and Riley (1984) or Laﬀont and Tirole (1986)).
As Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) observe, this rule is easy to implement in practice -
the courts need only verify if performance occurred, and then impose a suﬃciently large
penalty if not. They then provide conditions under which speciﬁc performance can ensure
eﬃcient investment and trade, signiﬁcantly extending the earlier results of Rogerson (1984)
and Shavell (1984). The beneﬁt of the rule is that it provides a method for enforcing eﬀort
revelation when the courts cannot observe relevant information, or when one party is credit
constrained.
However, the penalty doctrine (see Farnsworth (1999)) directs courts not to enforce liqui-
dated damage clauses that require payments, such as C in the contractual instrument given
in (2), that are out of proportion to actual damages. This doctrine allows courts to reduce
or waive liquidated damages.42 This rule can be used to explain some features of observed
contractual instruments. As an example, consider long-term contracts for inputs to a manu-
facturing process. Joskow (1988) describes in some detail the market for the supply of coal to
electric utilities. If parties are risk neutral, then in principle they could agree to terms that
might allow the contract price for coal to vary signiﬁcantly from the spot price. An interest-
ing feature of observed contract prices is that they closely follow the spot price for coal. This
raises the question of why parties engage in costly contract design, rather than use the spot
price? MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) provide a solution to this problem - if each party
needs to make a relationship speciﬁc investment that aﬀects their own payoﬀs, but not the
other’s (the so called self investment case), then it is eﬃcient to have a ﬁxed price contract.
However, over time the price of coal can ﬂuctuate a great deal. Parties could put into place
large penalties to enforce trade at the contract price, but these may not be enforceable under
the penalty doctrine. MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) show that if parties can index the
contractual instruments so that it follows the market price, then it is unnecessary to put into
place penalties for breach of contract, and moreover parties would still have the incentive
to make eﬃcient investments into relationship speciﬁc capital because their investments do
not aﬀect the price paid or received in the future. Edlin (1996) has another solution that
may work in some circumstances. He shows that Cadillac contracts that call for very high
performance can ensure eﬃcient investment under the rule of expectation damages.
These results do not resolve the issue of why courts are reluctant to enforce penalty
clauses. Thus there is an unresolved tension between the results of Aghion et al. (1994)
and Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) showing that the doctrine of speciﬁc performance allows
42See Posner and Rosenﬁeld (1977) for an early analysis of these issues.
25for the implementation of eﬃcient arrangements, while in practice courts are reluctant to
enforce such contracts. One possible reason for this reluctance is that courts must adjudicate
all disputes, including disputes involving poorly drafted and incomplete contracts. We now
turn to this issue.
3.6 Speciﬁc Performance and Expectation Damages compared
Both Schwartz (1979) and Ulen (1984), distinguished legal scholars, have argued that the
courts should use speciﬁc performance rather than expectation damages as the default re-
medial rule. In an important paper on mechanism design, Aghion et al. (1994) show in a
model with holdup, that the rule of speciﬁc performance can ensure eﬃcient investment and
exchange. Schwartz and Scott (2003) reiterate this point in a law review. Indeed, the eco-
nomics literature suggests that speciﬁc performance has superior eﬃciency properties than
expectation damages.
This conclusion, however, may underestimate judicial and party ingenuity. Consider the
case of construction contracts. The complexity of construction presents a particularly chal-
lenging environment to achieve ﬁrst-best outcomes even with speciﬁc performance. Bajari
and Tadelis (2001) introduce a simple and elegant way to formally introduce unforeseen
events into a model of construction contracts. The idea is that the time and money spent
drafting a contract can be viewed as relationship speciﬁc investment into the quality of the
contractual instrument. Let I be the investment into planning, and let (I) be the prob-
ability that only foreseen events occur. It is assumed that 0 > 0, and hence the quality
of planning increases with I: With probability 1   (I) an unforeseen event occurs. They
then compare two contract forms - ﬁxed price and cost plus. Under a ﬁxed price contract
the seller is responsible for delivering an acceptable product at the agreed upon price. This
implies that the seller receives all the returns from any cost saving actions.
In contrast, under a cost plus contract, the buyer pays all costs of production, thereby
reducing the incentives to the seller of making unobserved cost-reducing investments. If
all events are foreseeable, then the ﬁxed price contract implements the ﬁrst-best, while if
no event is foreseeable, then the cost plus contract is more eﬃcient. Thus, if the cost of
planning are suﬃciently low that unforeseen events occur with low probability, then a ﬁxed
price contract is optimal, and vice versa with respect to cost plus contracts. The model
delivers a theory of contract form as a function of the complexity of the environment, as
measured by the cost of planning.
Bajari and Tadelis (2001) assume, following the literature, that courts enforce agreement
26with speciﬁc performance as given. Chakravarty and MacLeod (2009) build upon their model
and explore how such contract are enforced. They begin with the structure of the American
Institute of Architects form construction contracts.
This class of contractual instruments is interesting because they are widely used in the
U.S. construction industry, and have evolved over 100 years in response to both experience in
the ﬁeld and the outcome of litigation involving construction disputes. Hence these contrac-
tual instruments are likely to satisfy the economists’ assumption that the form of observed
contractual instruments can be explained as an eﬃcient to solution to the problem of im-
plementing trade given transactions costs and the characteristics of the contracting parties.
Chakravarty and MacLeod (2009) show that these contracts can indeed be viewed as eﬃcient
under the following conditions:
1. The buyer’s design is costly in the sense of Bajari and Tadelis (2001).
2. The seller’s investment in cost reduction is not observable, though realized costs are
observable.
3. Buyer’s preferences are private information, and they can change between the time of
contract and project implementation.
4. Courts use expectation damages, but may excuse performance.
In practice construction must occur in the shadow of the law, and it is natural to ask if
eﬃcient trade is possible within existing law. The literature on mechanism design reviewed
above suggests that speciﬁc performance may be a necessary ingredient for eﬃcient trade.
Chakravarty and MacLeod (2009) ﬁnd that this is not the case – these contractual instru-
ments are able to implement the eﬃcient allocation with a generalized version of expectation
damages:
Damages = Foreseeability  Expectation;
where Foreseeability is a number between 0 (unforeseen) and 1 (perfectly foreseen) rep-
resenting the extent to which a lost is anticipated. If an event is unforeseeable, and/or
impractical, then the law excuses the breaching party from performance. On the other
hand, if the event is foreseen, then the rule of expectation damages applies. Both of these
extremes are consistent with current law. The rule is more general because, when an event
is only partially foreseeable, then damages should be reduced. This rule is implemented in
the AIA forms by leaving the damages in some cases to be determined by mutual consent.
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formance as a remedy remains an open question. The resolution of the debate over the
appropriate default remedy will likely entail a better understanding of the interplay between
the fact ﬁnding function of the courts, and the contractual environment. Notice, for example,
that the rule of speciﬁc performance can lead to opportunistic behavior on the part of the
seller. If the seller learns that the buyer has had an unfortunate event (say her plant burns
down), the she can take advantage of the seller’s low valuation b to threaten delivery under
the contract in order to extract a larger damage payment. If one can anticipate such behav-
ior, then the contract can be design to mitigate its costs. If b and c are private information,
then as Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) have shown, it is not possible to implement the
ex post eﬃcient allocation.
One of the messages of the literature on asymmetric information is that there are in-
evitably costs to revealing information. There is a growing literature that uses models of
asymmetric information to understand the process of litigation.43 This literature is not yet
integrated into the literature on contract design. Hence, we conclude that, in general, con-
tracts that vary with well deﬁned performance measures are in general enforceable. However,
contracts that entail large penalty payments, or rely upon speciﬁc performance on in general
not enforceable.
3.7 Summary
The basic message of this section is that the economic theory of contract does not rely upon
the complex institution that is contract law. For the standard principal agent problem this is
without great loss of generality. Performance pay contracts are in general enforced. However,
the more recent models that rely upon strong forms of speciﬁc investment are not in general
consistent with existing law.
This make help explain the tension that exists between the property rights approach to
the theory of the ﬁrm (Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1999) and Rajan and
Zingales (1998)), and the mechanism design approach to contract (Moore (1992), Maskin and
Tirole (1999), and Tirole (1999)). The former implicitly recognizes that contracts may be
limited in their ability to allocate bargaining power, something that can be better achieved
with ownership rights.
Parties to a contract are concerned with ensuring that they are able to rely upon the
contract and thus make appropriate relationship speciﬁc investments. In addition, there is
43See Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989) and Spier (2006) for excellent reviews of the literature.
28always an element of asymmetric information between parties and the courts that may also
lead to transactions costs that may be reduced with the appropriate allocation of bargaining
power. Rogerson (1992) has made some progress on integrating asymmetric information and
holdup, but much work remains. In particular, the contract literature has not incorporated
the fact ﬁnding activity of a court case into contract design. In this next section we discuss
the literature that explores these activities in more detail.
4 Adjudication
Section 3 examined the shadow cast by the substantive remedial rules of contract law.44
This section examines the judicial role in dispute resolution. Resolution of a contract
dispute requires a court to determine what obligations the parties have and whether any
obligation has been breached. The ﬁrst task requires the court to interpret the contractual
instrument. The second task requires the court to determine what in fact happened. Phrased
diﬀerently, contract disputes may arise for two distinct reasons. The parties may disagree
about “what happened”; in economic terms, they disagree about the realized state of the
world (including the actions undertaken by each party). Or the parties may disagree about
the content of their obligations.
Disagreement about the state of the world may arise even when contractual instruments
are complete. Disagreement about the obligations of the parties, by contrast, assumes either
that the contractual instrument is incomplete or otherwise defective, perhaps ambiguous or
inconsistent.
We organize our discussion into two parts. The ﬁrst section examines the literature on
fact ﬁnding. As virtually nothing has been written about the role of the court as a ﬁnder of
44We ignore here a substantial literature on the shadow cast by rule of bankruptcy. The law of bankruptcy
looms when one party cannot aﬀord to make a transfer required by a contract. In the case of agency theory,
given that the state provides a complete description of the environment, this constraint is anticipated and
incorporated into the design of the contractual instrument. (See Sappington (1983) and Innes (1990) for two
early important contributions and Lewis and Sappington (1999) for a recent contribution and discussion of
this literature.) The contract design ensures that, even in this case, there is no real role for the courts because
the transfers are always feasible. The contract design must reﬂect this constraint. There is a vast literature
in corporate ﬁnance that explores the consequence for contract design when parties face limited liability. (See
Gale and Hellwig (1985), Doornik (2010) and Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) for a comprehensive review
of this vast literature.) These papers can be viewed as contributing to our understanding of contracting in
the shadow of the law, where the shadow is cast by the rule that limits penalties to the ﬁnancial wealth of
defendants. This limitation was not always the case. In the past debtors might be sent to prison or face
other physical penalties. It is an open question why there has been an historical evolution toward limiting
liability to one assets. See Hansmann (2011) in this volume for further discussion on the historical evolution
of limits to ﬁnancial liability.
29facts in contract disputes, we review a related literature on fact-ﬁnding generally. The next
section addresses interpretation.
4.1 Fact Finding
4.1.1 Fact Finding in the Economics of Incomplete Contracts
The economic literature on contract classiﬁes facts into four classes: veriﬁable, jointly ob-
servable, observable by one party but not the other, and neither veriﬁable nor observable.45
A veriﬁable fact is one that is known (or knowable) publicly, that is, to both parties and to
any third party adjudicator. A jointly observable fact is known to both parties to the con-
tract but is not publicly available. Obviously a fact that is observable by one party but not
the other occurs in contractual environments with asymmetric information. Some facts, for
example, the precise state of the world, may be not observable. The existence of observable
but non-veriﬁable facts constrains parties in the drafting of contractual instruments (and
courts in the imposition of contractual obligations). An obligation cannot be conditioned on
a fact that is not veriﬁable.
This classiﬁcation is very extreme. Either a fact is veriﬁable (generally at 0 cost) or it is
not veriﬁable (at any cost). The situation in actual exchange environments is more nuanced.
A fact may be more or less veriﬁable at greater or lesser cost. One might say that a “more
veriﬁable” fact is one for which the court or other third party receives a more accurate signal.
Moreover, courts can use burdens of proof and burdens of persuasion to inﬂuence the quality
of signals that parties provide as well as distributing the consequences of erroneous signals.
Before considering the structure of judicial fact-ﬁnding, we note that much of the eco-
nomic literature investigates the consequences of non-veriﬁability for the form of a contrac-
tual instrument. One might, for example, understand the entire principal-agent literature
this way. Agent “eﬀort” is not veriﬁable (nor observable to the principal); consequently, the
parties require a contract that conditions the agent’s wage on other veriﬁable facts.
4.1.2 Judicial Fact Finding
A contractual instrument speciﬁes, against the legal backdrop, the obligations of each party.
Often the obligations of the parties are state-contingent; what each party must do varies with
the state of the world. Resolution of every contract dispute thus requires determination of
the actions that each party took and of the realized event.
45A more complete account would include dates, when a fact is known to whom.
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governed by distinct bodies of law (that generally go under the names of civil or criminal
procedure and evidence).46 We may assess these procedures along two dimensions: their
accuracy and their cost. In an ideal world, fact-ﬁnding would be perfectly accurate and
costless. In the real world, the invocation of courts is costly and courts themselves sometimes
err in their fact ﬁnding.47
As we discuss below, the economic theory of contract generally distinguishes observable
actions from veriﬁable actions. Courts costlessly observe veriﬁable actions with perfect
accuracy; courts cannot observe unveriﬁable actions at any cost.48 Most actions and events,
by contrast, are only veriﬁable at some cost and to some degree of accuracy.
A few models – Milgrom and Roberts (1986), Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) and Shin
(1998)–examine how accuracy varies with the fact-ﬁnding procedure. These models contrast
adversarial procedures in which each party presents evidence favorable to itself with inquisi-
torial procedures in which a non-partisan agent gathers evidence. These models identify
conditions under which adversarial procedures dominate inquisitorial ones.
These models require further elaboration to yield insights for an economic theory of
contract. In Milgrom and Roberts, the parties are fully informed about the state of the
world. In the legal context, by contrast, each party generally has only partial and asymmetric
information about the state.
Both Shin and Dewatripont and Roberts address questions of imperfect and asymmetric
information. Moreover, Shin’s model addresses adjudication directly. From a legal perspec-
tive, however, these models are in a “reduced” form. Each assumes that the agents and the
principal acquire information about the correct ﬁnal decision that, in Shin, is dichotomous
while, in Dewatripont and Tirole, is trichotomous. The decision in Shin thus corresponds
to the disposition of an adjudication, i.e. the judgment that Plaintiﬀ prevails or fails. The
disposition in a contract dispute depends both on the state of the world and on the obli-
gations imposed by the contract. These obligations, however, result from the process of
interpretation, discussed in the next subsection.
Common law adjudicatory institutions reﬂect this structure. Facts in contract disputes
in the United States are typically found by juries. Judges determine the law; that is, judges
46We ignore some evidentiary rules that are speciﬁc to contract law such as the statute of frauds which
requires a writing to enforce certain classes of contracts. On the statute of frauds, see Farnsworth (1999)
chapter 6
47We note in passing that the parties may, in the contractual instrument, alter the usual, default fact-
ﬁnding procedures.
48The economic literature treats unveriﬁable actions as a constraint on the contractual instrument.
31interpret the contractual instrument and determine the contractual obligations of the parties.
4.2 Contract Interpretation
Virtually all models in both the economics of contract and the economic analysis of contract
law make two critical assumptions about contractual behavior. First, the models assume
that contractual instruments are perfectly drafted: contractual instruments are clear and
consistent on their face. Second, the models assume that parties to the contract have foresight
and correctly anticipate the consequences of their actions, including those of the court.
Neither assumption is warranted; contractual instruments are inevitably incomplete, unclear
and often inconsistent. They require interpretation. Moreover, the practice of interpretation
is not completely transparent. As Goetz and Scott (1980) observe, courts have a complex
set of rules that often entail changing clearly speciﬁed performance obligations.
The economic theory of incomplete contracts does admit one important role for interpre-
tation. When an uncontracted-for event occurs, a court must ﬁll the gap in the incomplete
contractual instrument. The court must specify the obligations of the parties to determine
whether breach has occurred or not. The gap-ﬁlling ruling is often called a default rule.
Both the literature on incomplete contracts and the literature on the economic analysis
of contract law have studied default rules from two complementary perspectives. In the
incomplete contracts literature, this study has been implicit rather than explicit; it occurs in
the analysis of the causes of the incompleteness of contractual instruments. The economic
analysis of contract law, by contrast, has generally asked which default rules provide the
optimal background against which parties should draft their incomplete contractual instru-
ments. We discuss the choice of optimal default rules in the ﬁrst subsection and the role of
interpretation in contractual incompleteness in the second subsection.
Gap-ﬁlling, however, is not the sole purpose of interpretation. In the second subsection,
we discuss the sparse literature that adopts a more general approach to interpretation. As
noted in section 2.2, we can understand interpretation as a mapping from some set of inter-
pretative materials that include the contractual instrument but may include other texts and
actions into a set of contractual obligations for each possible event.
In economics, the dividing line between contract theory and other areas of the theory of
organization such as corporate governance or human resource management, typically turns
on the notion that courts merely enforce the terms of a written agreement. In contrast,
corporate governance focuses upon the design of decision rights for oﬃcers of the corporation.
In fact, a legally binding contractual instrument must explicitly deal with the allocation of
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each other the right to take the other party to a court of law for the adjudication of the
contractual instrument in the event of a breach. In the absence of courts, parties would have
to rely upon other instruments to enforce an agreement, such as reputation eﬀects, or threats
to reduce trade in the future, or even possibly threats of violence, as discussed in MacLeod
(2007).
4.2.1 What is Interpretation?
In the most basic sense, a contract is a complete list of terms k that specify, for each state 
of the world, the obligation a of each party: in state  seller must undertake action s and
buyer must undertake action b. A contractual instrument, by contrast, is a partial list of
terms. The list of terms in a contractual instrument is partial in at least two senses. Most
obviously, the instrument may not specify an obligation for every state of the world. In
addition, a contractual instrument may not fully specify the obligations of each party even
when it “covers” a state of the world. Interpretation is the process through which the court
completes the contractual instrument to yield a contract.
The contractual instrument and its partial list of terms may present several diﬀerent
interpretive problems:
1. Missing terms: the realized state  may not be on the partial list of states included in
the contractual instrument.
2. Ambiguous terms: A contractual instrument may specify an agent’s obligation am-
biguously or it may specify the event ambiguously.
3. Inconsistent terms: there is an event E for which are two clauses ki;kj specify con-
ﬂicting obligations. If event E occurs, it is not clear which action ai or aj should be
carried out.
4. Impossible terms: a term imposes an obligation that is impossible to perform in the
realized event even though that event is contemplated in the terms.
5. “Unwanted” terms: the contractual instrument may, in state , specify obligations that,
when  is realized, the parties dis-prefer to some other obligations.
Each of these defects present an interpretive problem for the court. As economic models
typically assume, suppose that the model parties use an accurate representation of their
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amount of law arising from these three contractual defects, there is little economic analysis
of these problems. We discuss each of these interpretive tasks in turn.
When the contractual instrument is missing a term, it is, in the most basic sense, “in-
complete.” The statement that “the contract is incomplete” is, by contrast, a rather crude
and not particularly helpful statement. After all, a simple rule of interpretation assures
that every contractual instrument is complete. Given any contractual instrument K, let Ec
be the set of states for which there is no speciﬁed obligation. If an event E  Ec occurs,
then we can complete the contractual instrument by supposing that neither party has an
obligation in this event. As one can always do this, one can always suppose, following Ayres
and Gertner (1992), that contracts are obligationally complete. Hence, for each contractual
instrument, either parties perform as speciﬁed in the agreement, or one party believes there
is breach of contract, in which case she has the right to an adjudication.
Notice that, when E  Ec, a court could adopt a diﬀerent rule to complete the contractual
instrument. The court might, for instance, require each party to perform the obligations that
are speciﬁed in some other other term k. Whatever speciﬁcation the court implies is called
a default rule. We discuss default rules in the next subsection.
A term may be ambiguous in two diﬀerent ways. Typically, a term k in a contractual
instrument does not address a single state . Rather it groups states into events E. Given
ordinary language, however, it may be unclear whether some state  is in E or not. Alter-
natively, the contractual instrument may have described the obligation of one of the parties
ambiguously. The parties may describe a party’s obligation in at least two diﬀerent ways.
Ideally, each term would specify a single obligation to the party; but, often, a contractual
instrument gives the party discretion. They might provide a list of tasks that the agent
may perform. Or the parties may describe a performance that the agent must accomplish.
Suppose a contractual instrument simple states “Deliver the fresh ﬁsh by 3pm today to 230
Mercer Street, New York City.” This instrument uses a performance to describe the action
set; it does not list the multitude of ways that the agent might actually deliver the ﬁsh by
3 pm – by cart at 2:59, by bicycle at 2:58, etc.49 The manner of speciﬁcation may aﬀect
the interpretive task for the court. It may be uncear whether the action undertaken by the
party falls within the description of the obligation.
A contractual instrument may also include inconsistent terms. For example, the contrac-
49Notice that these descriptions are incomplete. A complete description of the tasks would identify the
route the deliveryman took and the type of cart or bicycle she might use.
34tual instrument may specify that Seller supply 100 units when the price of wheat is less than
$5/bushel and 50 units when the price of corn is greater than $4 per bushel. If the price of
each is $4.50 per bushel, is the Seller in compliance when she supplies 50 units? A court
must resolve these inconsistencies.
Impossible terms are a particularly egregious example of an inconsistent term. This is a
very common case for simple contractual instruments, such as an agreement to supply q at a
price p: Events may make it impossible to supply q: In the well-known English case Caldwell
v. Taylor, for example, Plaintiﬀ had rented defendant’s opera house for a performance on a
given date; shortly before that date, the opera house burned down rendering performance of
defendant’s contractual obligation impossible.
When economists speak of incomplete contracts, they often mean contracts with un-
wanted terms: the parties have, for some state , speciﬁed obligations that are ineﬃcient.
There are some actions available to each party which would yield a higher total surplus to
be divided among them.50 The court must now decide whether to “reform” the contrac-
tual instrument and require the parties to undertake the eﬃcient actions rather than those
speciﬁed in the contractual instrument.
4.2.2 Default Rules
A default rule determines the obligations of the parties when an event occurs about which
the contractual instrument is “silent.” To reach this conclusion, of course, the court must
ﬁrst interpret the contractual instrument as not having addressed the realized event. Two
questions arise: why is the contractual silent? How should the court specify the missing
term?
At ﬁrst thought, the silence of a contractual instrument is perplexing. Consider, for
example, a paradigm supply example. Suppose a caterer contracts for the delivery of fresh
ﬁsh to a location for an event in the afternoon, at a agreed upon price p. The contractual
instrument is very simple; it requires the supplier to deliver by 3 pm, and emphasizes the
importance of timely delivery because the ﬁsh is for an important event. Now, suppose the
normally reliable supplier is involved in a traﬃc accident, and fails to deliver the ﬁsh which
results in irreparable harm to the caterer’s reputation for reliability.
The court must determine what damages, if any, should be assessed against the supplier
for breaching the promise to deliver the ﬁsh. Our example presents a classic problem of
50This ineﬃciency might arise in two ways. The parties may simply have made a mistake and speciﬁed
the wrong acts. Or the contract term may be overbroad; it speciﬁes a uniform action for all states in some
event E when eﬃciency requires that the action diﬀer.
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is puzzling because the parties surely understand that accidents sometimes happen. The
dispute does not arise from asymmetric information. As the accident was foreseen, why
haven’t the parties included terms in the agreement that cover such cases? A complete
contractual instrument would have clauses that specify payments that would be made when
there is non-performance. In this sub-section we review the various models that have been
introduced to explain why contractual instruments are incomplete. In section 4 we discuss
the role of the law in completing such incomplete contractual instruments.
Four reasons have been oﬀered for the silence of contractual instruments. First, Goetz
and Scott (1980) suggests that if breach is a very low probability event then parties may
ﬁnd that the ex ante cost of negotiating breach terms is greater than the beneﬁt. In this
case, they choose to delegate the damage decision to the court (see Shavell (1984) for a
formalization of this argument). In these cases they would like to court to set damages equal
to the amount they would have agreed upon ex ante. As we shall see in the next subsection,
costs of drafting provide a general answer to the ﬁrst question of silence and unwanted terms.
Second, contractual instruments may be strategically incomplete. Ayres and Gertner
(1989), Aghion and Hermalin (1990) and Spier (1992) show that a buyer with asymmet-
ric information about her own valuation may not include a term that speciﬁes liquidated
damages fearing that it will reveal how much he values the good. The seller could use this
information to increase the price. Hermalin and Katz (1993) suggest that courts should allow
parties to use “ﬁll in the blank” contractual instruments to enhance performance.
Third, and related, Bernheim and Whinston (1998) show that that parties may choose
to leave contractual instruments incomplete because this will increase the future gains from
trade, and thus increase the set of outcomes that can be supported by a subgame perfect
equilibria. This allows the parties to place more reliance upon the value of a future relation-
ship for enforcement, and thereby avoid costly enforcement via a court. Scott (2003) provides
some evidence from case law that is consistent with the results of Bernheim and Whinston
(1998), namely parties do seem use contract incompleteness to enhance the set of feasible
allocations. Baker et al. (1994) have what can be viewed as a countervailing result. Namely,
they show that if one adds a legally binding agency instrument then this can increase the
set of self-enforcing agreements. Using this idea, Schmidt and Schnitzer (1995) show that
when one party breaches a relational contract, then, rather than separate, the parties might
choose to use a contractual instrument that is enforceable in court. This would reduce the
cost from breaching and thereby reduce the set of contracts enforceable with a relational
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Finally, Bolton and Faure-Grimaud (2005) introduce an explicit planning model and
work out how these costs give rise to the incompleteness of contractual instruments. Tirole
(2009) interprets the cost of planning as a form of limited cognition, and then explores the
consequence of planning costs/limited cognition upon contract design. He shows that, if one
can hide one’s information, then the introduction of limited cognition can lead to adverse
selection, as in the model of Spier (1992).
The answer to the second question of the judical response to the silence of the contractual
instrument is equally complex but less developed. The complexity arises because contractual
parties will bargain in the shadow of the law. The content of the default rules will determine
whether parties contract over speciﬁed events or leave the instrument silent. Change the
default rule and one changes the content of a contractual instrument. Shavell (1984) shows
that, in principle, courts can choose default rules that allow short contractual instruments
to induce optimal contractual behavior.
In practice, the actual design of speciﬁc default rules is controversial. A prominent
view is that courts should ﬁll in gaps using so called “majoritarian defaults”. Under a
majoritarian default rule, the court supplies the term that the majority of individuals would
prefer. Economic analysts of contract law justify this choice on the grounds that it minimizes
drafting costs. (Goetz and Scott (1983)). Given that the majority of contracts are not
litigated, it is not at all obvious that such a notion is well deﬁned or knowable to contracting
parties.
Even knowable, the determination of the optimal default rule ex post is challenging.
Mechanism design theory reveals the inherent tension between ex post and ex ante eﬃciency.
The implementation of ex ante eﬃcient contracts often entails the use of actions that are
sometimes ex post ineﬃcient. If an event occurs that is not addressed in the contractual
instrument, how does one tell if it is a foreseen event that parties have delegated to the courts
to ﬁll, or one that is unforeseen? If the event is unforeseen then, as Hart (1990) observes,
the consequences upon reaching that state can have no eﬀect upon ex ante decisions. In that
case, the eﬃcient rule is always to choose an ex post eﬃcient allocation. As we have discussed
above, a deﬁning feature of expectation damages is that it is an attempt to achieve ex post
eﬃciency. Hence, though the rule of expectation damages does not necessarily achieve ex
ante eﬃciency, the fact that it approximates an ex post eﬃcient allocation makes it an
appropriate rule for unforeseen gaps in a contractual instrument.
Ayres and Gertner (1989, 1992) and Bebchuk and Shavell (1991) argued that, in con-
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that induces the informed party to reveal her private information. These papers consider
models with two types of buyers, and for which the optimal level of seller’s investment is a
function of the buyer’s type. The buyer’s type is assumed to be private information. The
authors show that a default rule that “penalized” buyers with a high type would, under
the appropriate circumstances, induce high type buyers to reveal their type. This model,
however, failed to clearly distinguish penalty from majoritarian defaults. If low type buyers
constituted a majority of the buyer population, then they would be indiﬀerent between the
two rules considered by the court.
4.2.3 Unwanted Terms
The economic literature on incomplete contracts has oﬀered an explanation for the presence
of unwanted terms. They may arise simply because of the complexity of the contractual
environment. This complexity requires that the parties invest time and resources into the
creation of a contractual instrument.
Deﬁning exactly what one means by “complex” remains an open question, or, more pre-
cisely, there are many deﬁnitions of complexity that depend upon the context. The formal
model of contract we describe above supposes that a contractual instrument is a collection
of event-obligation pairs. Events are subsets of the state space, which even for very simple
problems becomes astronomically large (see the discussions by Williamson (1975), chapter
2 and MacLeod (2002)). This implies that, even with small costs of adding clauses to a
contractual instrument, contractual instruments are likely to be very incomplete. This idea
is formalized in the work of Townsend (1979) and Dye (1985) in the context of a simple risk
sharing contract. They show that the ﬁxed costs of adding terms implies that there can be
only a ﬁnite number of events speciﬁed in any contractual instrument. This ﬁnite number
of terms classiﬁes an inﬁnite state space. Consequently, it “lumps” together a number of
states. An ideal contract would require distinct acts for some of these states; the contractual
instrument has produced an overbroad term that may require the “wrong” actions in some
realization and the ﬁrst best cannot be achieved.
Rather then endogenously ﬁxing the cost of a adding an event, Anderlini and Felli (1994,
1999)Anderlini and Felli (1994) endogenize these costs with a model of computational com-
plexity, and also show that the optimal contractual instrument trades oﬀ the cost of planning
costs against contractual completeness. Battigalli and Maggi (2002) extend this work and
discuss how contract complexity aﬀects the choice between rigid and ﬂexible contract terms.
38In their model, the parties may be unable to specify the optimal action.
This literature derives results on contractual form by assuming an interpretive practice
of the courts. Speciﬁcally, the literature assumes that a court will enforce the contractual
instrument as written; it will not reform the instrument and substitute ex post the term that
the parties would in fact want. Of course, courts may not adopt this interpretive practice.
The next subsection suggests that this interpretive practice is in fact not optimal.
4.2.4 Interpretation Generally
The focus on default rules arises naturally in a world in which contracting parties are fully
rational and have perfect foresight. Interpretation will play a larger role in worlds where
agents err and draft defective contractual instruments.
Even within the limits of perfectly foresighted parties, optimal interpretation requires
more than simply ﬁlling gaps. Shavell (2007) formalizes interpretation as a function from
the set of contractual instruments into itself. An interpretive method takes the contractual
instrument – a list of pairs of events and obligations – into another list of (event, obligation)
pairs.51
To understand the role of interpretation, we must consider the drafting options available
to the parties. Consider some state . The parties may draft a speciﬁc term that speciﬁes
obligations for  only; they may draft a general term that speciﬁes obligations for some event
E with  2 E, or the parties may ignore  and leave a gap in the contractual instrument.
Both gaps and general terms arise because it is costly to draft a term.
Given this, it follows immediately that the optimal method of interpretation has several
properties: (1) speciﬁc terms are enforced literally; (2) gaps are ﬁlled with “majoritarian”
defaults, and (3) general terms are, in some cases, overridden; the majoritarian default rule
may be applied to some  2 E: These results hold for a wide class of exchange environments.
There are, however, several caveats. First, there is no renegotiation. Second, there is perfect
contract enforcement. Finally, the it is not obvious how to link the formal language in
this model to observed phenomena. What is a “majoritarian default” and how can it be
measured? In fact, if these concepts where well deﬁned, a contract could simple be prefaced
by directions to the court that they should ﬁll gaps with majoritarian defaults. The diﬃculty
is that the real work of the courts it to ﬁgure out what is a majoritarian default, something
about which the theory is currently silent.
51As Shavell observes, and as we noted in section 2.2 above, an interpretive method might take more than
the text of the contractual instrument as its domain; the court might refer to additional texts and actions
to determine the obligations of the parties.
394.2.5 Delegation, Renegotiation and Interpretation
Interpretation determines the obligations of the parties to a contract ex post. There are two
other mechanisms for the ex post speciﬁcation of obligations that serve as partial substitutes
for judicial interpretation of the contractual instruments. Unlike judicial interpretation these
two ex post methods – delegation and renegotiation – have received extensive treatment in
the economic literature.
Each of these three methods permits the parties to impose or to alter an obligation ex
post. They diﬀer in the identiﬁcation of the agent that determines the content of the ex post
obligation. Delegation gives one of the parties the exclusive right to determine the obligation,
perhaps within limits speciﬁed in the contractual instrument. Renegotiation permits the
parties jointly to determine the content of the obligation ex post. Under interpretation, a
third party, the court, has the sole power to specify ex post the content of the obligation.52
Despite this common attribute, interpretation diﬀers in one important respect: interpre-
tation is always an available. Delegation (and the decisions of the delegate) and renegotiation
occur in the shadow of the law. It is important understand how legal institutions shape the
operation of delegation and renegotiation. The extent and operation of delegation within
a contractual instrument only has the range and force permitted by a court after interpre-
tation. Similarly, the outcome of a renegotiation depends on the disagreement point and
that point is determined by the interpretive practice of the court and the remedial rules of
contract law.
We focus on delegation or authority. As Lafontaine and Slade (2011) observe, contractual
instruments commonly include an allocation of control rights or authority. We shall see that
the reasons for such delegation mirror the reasons that provoke interpretation. This literature
may thus shed light on how best to model interpretive questions.
There are essentially three reasons for the allocation of authority to one party or an-
other, namely unforeseen or costly to foresee contingencies, asymmetric information and the
allocation of ex post bargaining power.
The ﬁrst formal model of authority, indeed the ﬁrst modern contract model, is due to
Simon (1951).53 He considered a model in which parties sign a contractual instrument, the
buyer learns the state of nature, and then the level of output that the seller is to provide the
52A contractual instrument might identify a third party other than the court. Many contractual instru-
ments provide for arbitration, a third party mechanism.
53Notions of authority and control are also central to the theory of the ﬁrm - see Gibbons (2005).
40buyer is determined. Formally the optimal allocation fq(x);pg solves:
maxfq(x);pg EfB(x;q(x))g   p
subjectto :
p   EfC(q(x))g  u0
where x is a random variable, c(q) is the cost of producing q, B(x;q) the beneﬁt of q in state
x, p is the price and u0 is the sellers outside option. Simon (1951) supposes that x is not
contractible and known only to the buyer. Hence, the buyer is constrained to choose between
two contractual instruments. The ﬁrst is a sales contract where price p and quantity q are
set in advance. The second is an employment contract, a contractual instrument in which
the seller (employee) agrees to supply any amount in a set Q at a price p. The beneﬁt of this
contractual instrument is that the buyer can adjust q as a function of information received
after the contractual instrument is signed.54
In terms of enforcement, notice that the employment contract has two elements. First,
the buyer, after observing x, creates a performance obligation, q(x) for the seller. If the
seller does not perform, then the seller has breached. In employment relationships, such
breach does not typically lead to damages, but to the dismissal of the employee. Thus,
the employment contract is enforceable only to the extent that dismissal is a suﬃciently
large penalty. A second element to the contractual instrument, namely the requirement that
q(x) 2 Q, might be enforced by requiring that the seller can only be dismissed with just
cause. If the employer asks for an action outside of the set Q; then the seller has a right to
refuse to carry out such actions.
An obvious application of the model is to the theory of the ﬁrm – namely a theory
that predicts when contracts are within the ﬁrm and when they are between ﬁrms. Alchian
and Demsetz (1972) argued that Simon’s employment contract could not be construed as
an explanation for why we have ﬁrms. They observe that the buyer and seller are free to
reach any agreement they wish, and should circumstances change the contract terms can be
renegotiated. Thus, as MacLeod (2002) shows formally, the introduction of renegotiation
ensures that Simon’s sales contract can always achieve the ﬁrst best. This result suggests
that, for a complete model of authority, one needs to add additional ingredients. One such
54Simon has in mind an elemental theory of bounded rationality that is captured by the hypothesis that x
cannot be explicitly contracted upon - a theme that the profession would not explore again until the 1980s.
The main result is that when uncertainty is suﬃciently important (variance of x suﬃciently large) then the
employment contract is most eﬃcient, otherwise parties will use a sales contract.
41ingredient is asymmetric information.
There are two ways in which asymmetric information may lead to an allocation of au-
thority rights. The ﬁrst of these has its roots in Williamson (1975)’s idea that contractual
relations are plagued by ex post opportunistic behavior that leads to costly contract renegoti-
ation. These costs are formally captured in the Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) model. If
there is two sided asymmetric information, and one is not sure if it is eﬃcient to trade, then it
is not possible to implement the eﬃcient allocation. Ayres and Talley (1995) and McKelvey
and Page (2002) show that one way to enhance the eﬃciency of bargaining with two sided
asymmetric information is to modify the status quo point in the event of a disagreement.
Asymmetric information is often invoked to explain why there may be costly contract
negotiation. A less emphasized implication is that investing in more information can reduce
negotiation costs. In particular, if there is one-side asymmetric information, then it is
possible to achieve an eﬃcient allocation by allocating all bargaining power to the informed
party. Chakravarty and MacLeod (2009) note that this observation is consistent with the
standard clauses in AIA form contracts that allocate authority for design changes to the
buyer, while requiring the buyer to compensate the seller for any measured out of pocket costs
arising from the change. This rule makes sense because while in principle one can measure
construction costs with careful book-keeping, the subjective valuation a buyer assigns to
design is diﬃcult, if not impossible to measure.
This diﬃculty is reﬂected in the common law enforcement of sales contracts that place an
obligation upon sellers to respond to changes in delivery terms requested by the buyers, and
provides an explanation of why speciﬁc performance is not used in these cases. It is eﬃcient
to grant authority to the buyer to modify her requirements, while protecting the sellers with
expectations damages that ensure her proﬁts are not reduced by the buyers actions.
The the Unites States Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is quite explicit regarding dam-
ages when the buyer refuses to accept delivery of goods:
§ 2-708. Seller’s Damages for Non-acceptance or Repudiation.
(1) Subject to subsection (2) and to Section 2-723:
(a) the measure of damages for nonacceptance by the buyer is the diﬀerence
between the contract price and the market price at the time and place for tender
together with any incidental or consequential damages provided in Section 2-710,
but less expenses saved in consequence of the buyer’s breach; and
(b) the measure of damages for repudiation by the buyer is the diﬀerence
between the contract price and the market price at the place for tender at the
42expiration of a commercially reasonable time after the seller learned of the re-
pudiation, but no later than the time stated in paragraph (a), together with
any incidental or consequential damages provided in Section 2-710, less expenses
saved in consequence of the buyer’s breach.
(2) If the measure of damages provided in subsection (1) is inadequate to put
the seller in as good a position as performance would have done then the measure
of damages is the proﬁt (including reasonable overhead) which the seller would
have made from full performance by the buyer, together with any incidental dam-
ages provided in this Article (Section 2-710), due allowance for costs reasonably
incurred and due credit for payments or proceeds of resale.
Notice that section 1(b) states that damages should be reduced by the amount saved by
the buyer’s breach. More generally, the seller under the common law has an obligation to
mitigate the lost. This would include stopping production at the time the buyer sends a
letter repudiating the contract. Under the rule of speciﬁc performance the seller would have
the right to continue production and then demand the seller to pay for the goods (which
might be optimal if the market price were less than the agreed upon price for the goods).
Aghion and Tirole (1997) introduce an innovative model of the authority relationship
that extends this theme. Their idea is that authority arises from the access to information
necessary to act. In their model, the principal with formal authority will delegate authority
to an agent who has better information. However, they will reserve the right to overrule an
agent when they are better informed. This model can be viewed as another way of explaining
employment contracts. The law gives the employer broad discretion when allocating tasks
to the employee, and the employer always has the formal right to change an employee’s task
as long as it is within the scope of work.
Finally, the allocation of authority also aﬀects the allocation of bargaining during contract
renegotiation that can occur when contractual instruments are incomplete and there is the
potential for holdup. The property rights literature of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart
and Moore (1990) implicitly builds upon the idea that courts do not generally enforce contract
breach through speciﬁc performance. Rather than regulate the relationship by contract,
they observe that bargaining power of parties can be allocated via ownership rights over
assets. Rajan and Zingales (1998) extend this idea to relationship within the ﬁrm, where an
organization can choose how much power agents have to grant access to ﬁrm resources.
435 Concluding Discussion: Economics, Law and Practice
A theory of contracts studies the relation among four theoretical objects: exchange environ-
ments, contractual instruments, contract law, and contractual behavior. The relation among
these concepts is complex. In the short term, the exchange environment and contract law
are exogenous; we thus seek to explain both contractual instruments and the resulting con-
tractual behavior in terms of the exogenously given contractual environment and contract
law. From a wider perspective, however, both contract law and, to a lesser extent, the ex-
change environment are endogenous. To a large extent, we choose the legal rules that govern
contractual instruments. Similarly, agents choose the environment in which they contract;
moreover they might act to alter the exchange environment in which they ﬁnd themselves.
Each aspect of the literature on contract focuses on a diﬀerent explanatory question. The
mechanism design literature asks: for a given contractual environment, does a mechanism
exist that induces eﬃcient contractual behavior? In this literature, a mechanism conﬂates
contractual instruments and contract law; it examines contracts, the set of obligations that
result from the operation of contract law on contractual instruments Nevertheless, the liter-
ature assumes a legal system that is basically utopian.
The incomplete contracts literature, by contrast, seeks to explain the structure of ob-
served contractual instruments. It often begins with some observed contractual instrument
and then asks: in what exchange environment is a speciﬁed contractual instrument optimal
for the parties? Once again, the structure and competence of the legal system is largely ide-
alized. The incomplete contracts literature explains the oddities of contractual instruments
largely without reference to any features of contract law.
The literature on the economic analysis of contract law, ﬁnally, abandons the assumption
of an ideal legal system. Rather, it often asks: given a contractual instrument within a
speciﬁc exchange environment, how does the legal rule inﬂuence contractual behavior? Here,
the legal system is not ideal though the literature has primarily relaxed only the assumption
of perfect enforcement.
Each of these literatures has provided signiﬁcant insight into contractual behavior and
the structure of contractual instruments. The mechanism design literature, for instance, has
provided clear, formal accounts of speciﬁc “transaction costs” such as asymmetric informa-
tion and analyzed the extent to which these features of the contractual environment impede
eﬃcient exchange. The assumption of an ideal legal system, however, limits the practical
insights available from these models. An assumption of perfect enforcement, for example,
implies that contractual behavior always conforms to the obligations embodied in the con-
44tractual instrument. Indeed, rational parties need never invoke an ideal legal system; the
shadow of the law is suﬃcient to regulate behavior. Similarly, the assumption that inter-
pretation is unambiguous, clear and foreseeable implies that parties can always implement
perfectly their intentions.
The economic analysis of contract law adopts complementary simplifying assumptions. It
generally studies very simple exchange environments; we have little idea how the ideal legal
rule would vary across exchange environments. Similarly, it generally focuses on the eﬀects
of legal rules on contractual behavior but ignores the eﬀects of legal rules on contractual
instruments. It has provided few explanations for variation in available remedies across
exchange environments and contractual instruments. Why, for instance, are common law
employment contracts at-will rather than protected by expectation damages? Moreover, the
formal study of interpretation is in its infancy. Models have very crude representations of
the the rules of interpretation in part because the literature has not exploited the language
formulated in Battigalli and Maggi (2002).
This caricatured sketch of these literatures points clearly to promising paths of future
research. We need to meld the sophisticated analyses of exchange environments and contrac-
tual instruments to the simple models of non-ideal legal institutions. The mechanism design
literature might investigate the set of achievable allocations under non-ideal legal systems.
Imperfect enforcement will impede the realization of ﬁrst-best allocations. How good must
contract enforcement be to yield the ﬁrst-best? How costly is imperfect enforcement?
Relaxing the assumption of unambiguous interpretation is apt to be both more diﬃcult
and more fruitful. Contracting agents rarely use new or innovative language in their con-
tractual instruments. Contractual terms that have been subject to extensive interpretation
provide a more certain environment against which to contract. This observation that many
contractual terms might be sub-optimal relative to the world in which interpretation is un-
ambiguous and costless. Thus, at least some features of observed contracts, likely respond
to the failings of the courts and contract law.
In terms of a way forward, the ﬁrst step is to work more on models that help us build
empirical representations of the legal system. Theories create conceptual categories that
should have analogues in practice. Second, what are the testable implications of these
theories? There is surprisingly little discussion of how one could formulate an empirical
hypothesis that can be brought to the data.
One of the real diﬃculties with attempting to study contract law is that it is impossible
to build data on the universe of contracts. Litigated cases are the exception, rather than
45the norm. Moreover, when drafting a contract parties draw upon both litigated cases and
industry practice. Hence, as Manski (1993) showed in the context of social networks, it will
be very diﬃcult to identify the causal impact of contract law upon contract performance.
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